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1
Introduction
Segerberg presented a general completeness proof for (2-valued) propo-
sitional logics. For this purpose, a Natural Deduction system was defined in
a way that its rules were rules for an arbitrary boolean operator in a given
propositional logic. Each of these rules corresponds to a row in the operator’s
truth-table. In the first part of this thesis we extend Segerberg’s idea to finite-
valued propositional logic and to non-deterministic logic. We maintain the idea
of defining a deductive system whose rules correspond to rows of truth-tables,
but instead of having n types of rules (one for each truth-value), we use a
bivalent representation that makes use of the technique of separating formulas
as defined by Carlos Caleiro and João Marcos. We go further and extend again
our framework to include non-deterministic semantics.
Apart from its philosophical and mathematical importance, many-valued
logics have provided a vast field of study in model theory and proof-theory. The
definition of a complete and sound deductive system for a class of many-valued
logics can certainly be seen as a contribution for this vast field. As possible
applications of the results presented here, it’s worth mentioning the use of
many-valued logics in computer science to deal with problems of epistemic
gaps, paradoxical knowledge and degrees of believe.
The systems defined have, in general, so many rules it might be laborious
to work with it. We believe that a sequent calculus system defined in a similar
way would be more intuitive. Motivated by this observation, in the second
part of this thesis we work out translations between Sequent Calculus and
Natural Deduction, searching for a better bijective relationship than those
already existing, such as the translations defined in (8, 21, 15).
Logic has a strong syntactical and deductive tradition, semantics is
relatively new in logic. From the model-theoretic point of view there might
be many approaches to provide semantics. Algebras, categories and Tarski-
based semantics are some examples. There is also proof-theoretical semantics.
The Curry-Howard isomorphism can be seen as one of the most well-known
representatives of this kind of semantics. Categorical models can be also
considered as representatives of this proof-theoretical approach. However, even
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for the most well-known propositional logics, proof-theoretical semantics faces
some problems. Natural Deduction and Sequent Calculus are mostly taken
into account when discussing such problems. One of the points that deserve
special attention is the (potential?) isomorphism between both systems. When
considering normal and cut-free proofs, the literature has reported some
problems as discussed in chapter 4.
Equivalences between natural deduction and sequent calculus have been
discussed since their definition by Gentzen (8). By equivalence between the
systems we mean that every derivation in one system can be transformed into
a derivation in the other. Such equivalence being established, the search for
a stronger equivalence starts. Some examples are Zucker (21), who shows a
correspondence between normalization and cut-elimination for the fragment
{^,!, 8,?}, followed by Pottinger (17), who improved Zucker’s method
by simplifying it and extending it to the full intuitionistic propositional
logic. Danos, Joinet and Schellinx (7) have an isomorphism between Sequent
Calculus and Natural Deduction passing through Linear Logic. Nigam and
Miller (16) showed that di↵erent proof systems, including Natural Deduction
and Sequent Calculus, have the same provable sets of formulas by encoding
the systems into a Focused Linear Logic. In (10), Henriksen showed that
Linear Logic is not needed and showed a similar result from that of (16)
by encoding the systems into a focused intuitionistic system. Negri and von
Plato (15) showed the relation between structural rules in sequent calculus
and discharge of formulas in natural deduction. Due to the structural rules,
the correspondence shown in (15) is not one-to-one (see chapter 4).
In chapter 2, we extend Segerberg’s (19) showing a schema that allow
us to define the rules for any connective in any finite-valued propositional
logic and we show soundness and completeness of such a system. In chapter 3
we extend the result obtained in chapter 2 to non-deterministic propositional
logic. In chapter 4 we show a bijection between a Sequent Calculus system
and a Natural Deduction system but only when dealing with cut-free and
normal derivations. Non-cut-free and non-normal derivations are the subject
of chapter 5 and in chapter 6 we discuss how our proposed bijection can be
considered as a better solution to our relationship between Natural Deduction
and Sequent Calculus as stated by (15): “cut-free proofs in sequent calculus
and normal proofs in natural deduction became mere notational variants of
one and the same proof”.
